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Abstract 
How are policy competences allocated between different actors? This paper contributes to the 
literature on institutional development through an in-depth case-study of the conditions under which 
the competence over the negotiation of agreements on foreign direct investment (FDI) was transferred 
from the national level to the European Union (EU) in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. Most analysts assume 
that this competence shift was a rationally designed delegation, intended to maximize European 
bargaining power in international investment negotiations, and conceived as an important element of a 
teleological drive to make the EU a meaningful external actor. This paper tells a different story--one 
where the competence shift happened by stealth as a result of a combination of Commission 
entrepreneurship and historical accident, against the preferences of the Member States. The paper also 
assesses whether the conditions under which the competence was transferred have implications on the 
implementation of the new policy. 
Keywords 
BIT; Common Commercial Policy ; Convention; EU; FDI; investment ; Lisbon Treaty; single voice 
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Introduction* 
How are policy competences allocated between different institutional actors? Do competence shifts 
result from rational design, historical accidents, or clever political entrepreneurship by specific actors? 
This paper contributes to the literature on institutional development through an in-depth case-study of 
the political conditions under which the competence over the negotiation of agreements on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was transferred from the national level to the European Union (EU) in the 
2009 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, hereafter referred to as the Lisbon 
Treaty), which folded FDI under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). 
This new EU competence over the negotiation of international investment policy is, on the face of 
it, a radical change with potentially massive implications since the EU is the first sender and the first 
recipient of FDI worldwide (41.7% of outward FDI stock and 34.2% of inward FDI stock in 2012) 
(UNCTAD, 2013). The EU can now theoretically take over the negotiation of all international 
investment agreements for the Member States in order to liberalize foreign markets and protect 
European investments abroad, and it can harmonize the rules governing the establishment of foreign 
investments inside the EU. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the 
European Commission has prepared a series of communications and regulations to translate the new 
legal competence into implementable policies. The European Parliament, which was granted new 
powers of approval or rejection of all trade and investment agreements under the Lisbon Treaty, has 
produced several reports and resolutions on this issue. The EU will soon launch the negotiations of a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with China, the first under the new competence. 
Scholars of FDI are now busy dissecting the implications of this radical change. Lawyers are 
finessing how competences are really divided between the EU and the Member States under the new 
regime (Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and its Member States in the Area 
of Investment Politics, 2011; Herrmann, 2010; Chaisse, 2012; Krajewski, 2005). Economists are 
asking how the new competence will affect economic growth and competitiveness (Blomkvist, 2011). 
Political scientists are exploring whether the new supranational competence will enable the EU to 
finally leverage its collective power of bargaining (Niemann, The Common Commercial Policy: From 
Nice to Lisbon, 2012; Meunier, Divide and Conquer: How China Can Exploit the Multiplicity of 
Investment Rules in the EU, 2013b).  
What all these studies have in common is an assumption that this transfer of competence was a 
rationally designed delegation by the Member States, intended to maximize European bargaining 
power in international investment negotiations, and conceived as an important element of a 
teleological drive to make the EU a meaningful external actor. Instead, this paper argues, this radical 
shift, which ran counter to the preferences of all Member States and was not initiated by pressure 
groups, occurred by stealth and almost by accident. Consequently, because the Member States did not 
debate openly the supranationalization of foreign investment policy ahead of the institutional shift, it 
makes the implementation of the new policy more difficult, especially in the current general context, 
which is not conducive to the further creep of European integration.  
How to explain the puzzling circumstances under which this radical competence shift took place in 
the face of opposition from almost all the Member States? This paper first explores three rationales for 
the competence shift: a response to the growing importance of FDI in globalization; a response to the 
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institutional confusion created by the evolution of international investment negotiations in practice 
over the past two decades; and a response to the bargaining costs imposed on the EU and its Member 
States by cacophony. Section Two analyzes the diverging preferences of the main policy actors and 
shows that far from unanimously embracing the transfer, the Commission and the Member States had 
divergent preferences and could not agree on updating the formal rules of the EU to reflect the new 
reality of FDI. Section Three retraces the historical steps that led to the stealthy inclusion of foreign 
direct investment under the Common Commercial Policy in the Lisbon Treaty and analyzes alternative 
explanations for why that shift was allowed to occur. Section Four assesses whether the conditions 
under which the competence was transferred have implications on the implementation of the new 
policy. 
1. Competence shift as Rational Design 
If we assume that states design international commitments rationally, as the “rational design” literature 
does (Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal, 2001), then shifting the competence over FDI to the 
supranational level seemed like a rational decision for the EU as a whole for three main reasons: a 
response to the growing importance of FDI in globalization; a response to the institutional confusion 
created by the evolution of international investment negotiations in practice over the past two decades; 
and a response to the bargaining costs imposed on the EU and its Member States by cacophony. 
A response to the growing importance of FDI in globalization 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community, did not bring foreign 
investment policy under supranational reach, unlike what it did for trade policy, whose competence 
was transferred to the collectivity from the start. FDI, not an important economic issue at the time, was 
ignored by the drafters of the treaty. While it might have made sense at the time, it no longer did after 
the 1980s when FDI started to grow very fast, both because of deregulation and because Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) decupled between 1980 and 1999, jumping from 181 to 1,856 (UNCTAD, 
2000). As a result, that period saw an explosion of FDI worldwide.  
European countries were major actors of this explosion, both at the sending and receiving end. By 
1999, companies based in the European Union accounted for two thirds of all investment outflows, 
and extra-EU FDI surpassed intra-EU FDI for the first time in 1997. Today, the EU is the world’s 
largest exporter of FDI, with over $9 trillion in FDI stock abroad --twice as much as the U.S. stock 
abroad and almost half of the total value of FDI stock in the world (OECD, 2013). As for inflows, the 
EU is also the world’s biggest recipient of foreign direct investment with about one third of FDI stock 
worldwide (UNCTAD, 2013).  
It therefore seems like a rational and “natural” (Peterson & Ceyssens, 2003) decision to update the 
EU rules governing international investment on market access, treatment standards, and protection in 
order to reflect the new reality of FDI in the economy and to protect European assets abroad (EU 
Parliament, 2010). According to DG Trade’s own words, “the EU's investment policy is focused on 
providing EU investors and investments with market access and with legal certainty and a stable, 
predictable, fair and properly regulated environment in which to conduct their business” (European 
Commission DG Trade, 2013). Similarly, a major EU Parliament report on the new EU approach to 
international investment policy after Lisbon states that “extending EU exclusive competence to 
include FDI now provides an opportunity to develop a common, comprehensive European Union 
approach to investment policy that can improve EU competitiveness and help obtain better access for 
EU investors in third markets; extend the protection afforded to EU outward investors beyond the 
existing member state bilateral investment treaties and promote EU norms in the field of sustainable 
investment” (EU Parliament, 2010). 
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A response to competence confusion 
Although the formal EU rules governing international investment policy had not changed during the 
period of FDI explosion, however the practice of international investment policy in the EU became 
very complex, with some aspects dealt with at the supranational level while other aspects remained at 
the national level. It seemed rational to formalize the competence shift to put an end to the institutional 
confusion and legal uncertainty for foreign investors. 
The Member States were solely responsible for negotiating and concluding their own BITs, which 
deal mostly with protection and post-establishment of foreign investment. EU countries had been 
particularly active in concluding BITs. By the time of the Lisbon Treaty, Member States had about 
1200 extra-EU BITs with 148 countries, accounting for almost half of investment agreements in the 
world. Some countries, such as Germany, have more than 100 BITs. As for inward FDI, both the 
promotion and the vetting of inbound foreign investment have taken place entirely at the national 
level.  
Nevertheless, competence for the negotiation of international investment agreements had “crept” to 
the Commission in practice for two reasons. First, trade and investment had become so intertwined 
that the EU had insidiously gained some practical competence over FDI policy as time went by 
because of its existing competence and “single voice” over trade (Meunier, Trading Voices: The 
European Union in International Commercial Negotiations, 2005; Meunier & Nicolaidis, Who Speaks 
for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, 1999; Elsig, The EU's Common 
Commercial Policy: Institutions, Interests and Ideas, 2002; Kerremans, 2006; Duer & Zimmermann, 
2007). Even though the Member States were responsible for concluding their own investment 
agreements, the Commission did negotiate market access and pre-establishment conditions for 
European investments in the free trade agreements it was negotiating collectively, both multilaterally 
and bilaterally. 
In multilateral trade negotiations, the EU Commission was in charge of negotiating the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), and the so-called “Singapore issues” –even if Member States contested in practice that 
delegation. Alongside the Member States, the EU was negotiating the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investments (MAI) in the OECD and is a member of the Energy Charter Treaty --a multilateral 
investment treaty with 47 contracting parties designed to protect investments in the energy sector. At 
the bilateral level, the EU has negotiated, and is negotiating, a plethora of comprehensive free trade 
agreements which include investment chapters on market access and protection (e.g. with South 
Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Chile). 
Second, the Commission had employed “stealth” measures since the 1980s to influence, regulate, 
and even vet FDI through areas in which it was formally competent, such as competition policy, trade 
defense instruments, and critical infrastructure (Van Den Bulcke & Zhang, 2013). The Commission 
could influence FDI through its competition policy, for instance by the enforcement of the rules on 
types and levels of state aid (which often involved foreign acquisitions or joint ventures with foreign 
partners).
1
 Another competition instrument with FDI implications is the EU Merger Regulation 
(EUMR), in existence since 1989 and reformed in 2004 as part of EU competition law (European 
Council, 2004). The screening of foreign investments was certainly not the intent behind the merger 
instrument, designed to prevent harmful anti-competitive concentration of economic power, but it is an 
unintended consequence. In particular, acquisitions made in Europe by state owned enterprises (SOE) 
are subject to review, if they meet the size criteria (Van Den Bulcke & Zhang, 2013). Trade defense 
instruments, such as anti-dumping and rules of origin (many designed in the 1980s against the 
Japanese practice of investing to circumvent trade barriers), also shaped the investment decisions of 
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foreign actors. Finally, the Commission could vet FDI through the 2006 European Programme for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which resulted from a 2004 initiative to combat terrorism 
(European Commission, 2006). This program stipulates that “critical infrastructure” --defined as 
systems and facilities needed for “maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, 
economic or social well-being of people”-- should be identified and protected via a “common 
minimum approach” (EU Council, 2008). Thus, the EPCIP permits the EU to vet foreign investment 
deals on national security grounds.  
A response to the costs of cacophony  
This formal cacophony, with each state negotiating individually, and the informal confusion, resulting 
from the juxtaposition of supranational and national responsibilities, was proving costly for European 
states. It thus seemed rational to eliminate these costs by shifting competence to the EU level. 
The most obvious cost has been on bargaining leverage -- the absence of unison leading Europe to 
“punch below its weight” on at least two counts: market access and shaping the international context 
(Thomas, 2012; Elsig, The EU as an effective trade power? Strategic choice of judicial candidates in 
the context of the World Trade Organization, 2013; Da Conceicao-Heldt & Meunier, 2013; Niemann 
& Bretherton, EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and Effectiveness, 
2013). Because each Member State was negotiating on its own and could not make promises on behalf 
of the other Member States, it could not harness the market power of the whole EU by dangling the 
carrot of access to the entire Single Market and as a result force large economies to reciprocate by 
opening their own domestic market to foreign investment in return. Similarly, the EU has not been 
able to impose to the rest of the world its norms, values, and rules for fashioning international 
investment regimes in a way commensurate with its place as the world’s leading exporter and recipient 
of FDI (Bungenberg, The Division of Competences between the EU and its Member States in the Area 
of Investment Politics, 2011). Others, especially the NAFTA countries, have created de facto global 
standards for investment agreements, which the EU could not match, whether for human rights, labor 
standards, or sustainable development.  
When it came to inbound investments, another cost has been the competition between Member 
States which this cacophony has induced. Countries, as well as sub-regional units (such as U.S. states), 
typically use a variety of financial and non-financial incentives to compete for FDI location: tax 
breaks and other fiscal incentives, infrastructure improvements, education and training assistance, 
flexibility and ease of bureaucratic procedures, etc. Unlike regional subunits, however, the countries of 
the EU are also competing with each other through regulatory and policy incentives. Formally, this 
competition can occur through national regimes for screening foreign investments, which can be more 
or less lax. Informally, this competition can take place through policies which are still national, such 
as labor standards (e.g. Greece turning a blind eye to labor violations committed by foreign investors), 
citizenship (e.g. Hungary granting automatic residency to those who invest 250,000 euros), and even 
foreign policy (e.g. leaders no longer meeting with the Dalai Lama in order to attract Chinese FDI) 
(Meunier, A Faustian Bargain or Just a Good Bargain? Chinese Foreign Direct Investment and Politics 
in Europe, 2013a; Burgoon & Raess, 2013).  
From the perspective of some individual Member States, this cacophony can be seen as a benefit. 
Countries can exploit their lax investment screening as comparative advantage to attract specific 
investors (such as China). From the perspective of the collectivity, however, this competition to attract 
foreign investment is costly if it leads to a regulatory race to the bottom. Moreover, the longer the 
cacophony remains the modus operandi in the EU, the denser the thicket of existing extra-EU 
investment agreements and the lower the incentives for third countries to renegotiate agreements with 
the collectivity instead. Delegating the competence to negotiate international agreements over 
investment policy to the supranational level as soon as possible is expected to lead to more optimal 
Integration by Stealth: How the European Union Gained Competence over Foreign Direct Investment 
5 
outcomes (Meunier, Divide and Conquer: How China Can Exploit the Multiplicity of Investment 
Rules in the EU, 2013).  
2. Divergent preferences over the competence shift 
This section examines the preferences of the Commission, the Member States, and pressure groups 
vis-à-vis the competence shift, as summarized in Table 1. It shows that far from unanimously 
embracing the transfer, the Commission and the Member States had divergent preferences and could 
not agree on updating the formal rules of the EU to reflect the new reality of FDI policy. 
Table 1: Preferences over FDI Competence Shift 
Pro-Competence Shift  Anti-Competence Shift 
 
Commission 
Why?  
-For practical/logistical 
reasons 
-For competence extension 
When? 
-Maastricht IGC (1992) 
-Amsterdam IGC (1997) 
-Nice IGC (2000) 
-Convention IGC (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
Outbound FDI 
 
EU Parliament post-
Lisbon 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Groups 
 
 
 
BusinessEurope (form. UNICE) 
 
 
 
Member States 
Why? 
-for fear of supranational power 
grab and sovereignty loss 
-conflicting preferences over 
regulation of inbound FDI 
 
Interest Groups 
-labor, consumer, environment, 
etc. 
 
National business associations 
(e.g. France, U.K.< Germany) 
 
 
Inbound FDI 
Commission preferences 
The preferences of the Commission (mostly DG Trade) have been clearly and persistently in favor of 
regulating and transferring FDI policy to the EU level. Indeed, the Commission had called, 
unsuccessfully, for a competence shift for more than a decade before it finally happened during the 
Convention. This was altogether for practical reasons, for reasons of improving EU economic 
competitiveness, and for reasons of competence extension for itself. 
The issue was initially raised during the Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1992 but was quickly abandoned. The issue of including “foreign direct investment” in 
the Common Commercial Policy was reopened again by the 1996 Commission opinion for the IGC 
that resulted in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. But that IGC took place in the tense context created by 
Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which was tasked with determining who, of the 
Commission or the Member States, was responsible for negotiating and concluding agreements over 
trade in the growing field of services (Meunier & Nicolaidis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation 
of Trade Authority in the EU, 1999). The ECJ had in effect sent the ball back to the politicians, and 
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the reform of the Common Commercial Policy to include trade in services was already sufficiently 
contentious without compounding it with the issue of international investment. 
The Commission reintroduced yet again the issue of extending EU competence to investment 
policy in its opinion for the 2000 IGC that led to the Treaty of Nice. But the political context was not 
ripe for two main reasons. First, the imminent enlargement of the EU to a dozen more countries, all 
with disparate and even contradictory interests, lent a sense of urgency to the negotiation over the 
reform of Article 133, the main article governing trade policy –this was not the time to tackle yet 
another new issue onto the already busy agenda (Meunier & Nicolaidis, The European Union as a 
Trade Power, 2011). Second, globalization –mostly in its trade and investment dimensions—had 
recently become a hot political issue leading to massive mobilizations worldwide. Just two years 
earlier, the negotiations conducted since 1995 under the auspices of the OECD for the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI), which aimed to ensure that host governments would treat foreign 
and domestic firms similarly in order to facilitate international investment, had been derailed both for 
lack of support by the negotiations parties (especially France and the U.S.) and by vigorous public 
demonstrations organized by a diverse collection of non-state actors (Walter, 2001; Henderson, 1999; 
Kobrin, 1998). To the very public failure of the MAI succeeded the following year the very public 
failure to launch the Millennium Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in Seattle, 
where an eclectic collection of anti-globalization activists had again mobilized and protested that “the 
world is not for sale” (Klein, 1999; Bové & Dufour, 2001). Since the Nice IGC took place in this 
context, no one at the Commission or the Member States judged that this would be a propitious time to 
debate over the inclusion of FDI policy under exclusive competence –even if the Treaty extended EU 
competence to most trade in services, including service-related investment. 
After failures at the Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice IGCs, the Commission asked again that 
foreign investment regulation be included under the Common Commercial Policy during the IGC that 
led to the Constitutional Treaty. Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy specifically asked the 
Convention’s Working Group VII on external relations to include the regulation of investment policy 
(Lamy, 2002). 
Member State preferences 
Member States did not share at all the Commission’s preferences for a competence shift. Yes, the 
arguments about the costs of cacophony and confusion could be compelling for some, but overall they 
were dominated by the costs of relinquishing sovereignty. For outbound FDI, the preferences of all the 
Member States are similar: open external markets for their own investments and obtain maximum 
protection for these investments. But preferences are more diverse when it comes to inbound FDI, and 
Member States were not ready to give up their ability to regulate who invests in what on their own 
territory. Indeed, no Member State was in favor of the competence transfer. 
For the many Member States exporting FDI, the worry was great that a supranational regime 
regulating, and constraining, investments would prompt more restrictions on their own foreign 
investments.  
When it comes to inbound FDI, EU countries are employing a variety of methods which put them 
in competition with one another, such as national investment promotion agencies, fiscal and 
infrastructure incentives, and various regulations on FDI screening. The Member States that do benefit 
from this regulatory competition, especially through laxer screening procedures, have no incentive to 
push for a more cohesive approach to FDI policy. The Member States that do have stringent screening 
rules did not want to transfer in practice the authority over inbound investment policy to the EU either, 
because it might jeopardize their own national security should such a screening mechanism may be 
forfeited by the majority of Member States. As for the other Member States (such as the Scandinavian 
countries), they may fear that the transfer of such authority to the EU would create a more restrictive, 
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protectionist investment regime, and therefore oppose such a transfer on liberal grounds. The bottom 
line is: no Member State supported a transfer of FDI competence to the EU. 
Pressure groups preferences 
Although FDI decisions are primarily an economic consideration driven by market forces, they are 
also deeply shaped by the economic, political, and legal rules governing investment in the host 
country. As a result, pressure groups have fought over the design of these rules, but none was really 
the instigator of the competence shift. 
When the idea of a common EU investment policy started to surface during the 1990s, as annual 
global flows of FDI had risen from $60 billion in 1985 to $315 billion in 1995 throughout the world 
(Walter, 2001), leading academics argued that it was necessary to regulate FDI (Graham, 1996). So 
did international business organizations and large multinational corporations, which preferred a more 
uniform policy framework for investments instead of the highly complex and variegated patchwork of 
existing national and bilateral rules. As a result, the WTO, the OECD, and other international 
organizations started to craft and negotiate multilateral investment regulations. 
The EU-wide business organization Business Europe (formerly UNICE), as well as other EU-wide 
business associations such as the European Services Forum supported the EU’s handling of investment 
agreements with a single voice at the time of the Convention, but they were not particularly proactive 
about it (UNICE, 2003). These same organizations again approached the EU to demand a single EU 
investment agreement with China in order to tackle barriers to European FDI in China in 2011 
(European Commission, 2011). But even these organizations, which wanted a unified stance for 
outbound FDI, did not favor a unified stance for inbound FDI. UNICE/Business Europe specifically 
declared to have “serious concerns over proposals to create a Committee on Foreign Investment in the 
United States or CFIUS-type review procedure to vet foreign proposals for mergers and acquisitions.” 
(BusinessEurope, 2008)  
Moreover, not all business organizations supported the competence shift. Many national business 
associations were actually opposed to the shift and let it be known before the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty. After the Treaty came into force, the lobbying by European business organizations against the 
new sweeping powers of the EU over FDI policy, especially the Member States’ ability or lack thereof 
to negotiate new BITs, intensified, particularly coming from the German Industry Federation (BDI), 
the United Kingdom’s Confederation of British Industries (CBI), and the French MEDEF (Corporate 
Europe Observatory, 2010) 
As for non-business pressure groups and non-governmental organizations, many pressure groups 
and non-governmental organizations were opposed to the transfer of the competence over international 
investment policy to the supranational level –such as environmental groups, labor groups, consumer 
groups, and intellectuals intent on protecting national culture-- like they did had successfully done for 
the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment. 
3. FDI, From National to Supranational Competence 
The Lisbon Treaty formally transferred FDI competence to the EU. This competence shift seems like a 
well thought-out response to an outdated, confused, and costly situation --a rationally designed 
delegation intended to maximize European bargaining power in international investment negotiations 
and assert the EU as a meaningful external actor. This section tells a different story, however --one 
where the radical transfer of competence crept its way into the treaty by stealth and serendipity and 
resulted from Commission actions and Member State inaction.  
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The inclusion of FDI policy in the Convention 
The new EU-wide policy on FDI was not initially planned as the Member States proceeded to launch 
the “Convention on the Future of Europe”, which was expected to usher in a new European 
constitution. During the Convention, the Common Commercial Policy had been folded into the busy 
Working Group VII on the EU’s external action, which also covered the creation of an external action 
representative, an external action service, defense, foreign aid, development issues, etc. As a result, 
trade policy received little attention in the deliberations of the working group. There was some limited 
debate about the existence of mixed competences and qualified majority voting in the field of services, 
mostly led by Sweden and Finland (Niemann, The Common Commercial Policy: From Nice to 
Lisbon, 2012), as well as about an enhanced role of the European Parliament over trade policy 
decisions, but the issue of foreign direct investment was not raised, except by Trade Commissioner 
Pascal Lamy –but to no avail. The final report of the working group, prepared by the Convention’s 
Secretariat under the presidency of Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium), did not include any reference to 
investment policy (European Convention Secretariat, 2002).  
The Praesidium met to discuss the recommendations of the working group on April 22 and 23, 
2003 at Val Duchesse. This was a particularly contentious meeting: European politicians and policy-
makers were discussing foreign policy barely a month after the start of the U.S.-led intervention in 
Iraq, which had divided Europe.
2
 After the president of the Praesidium, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, left 
the meeting, the discussion continued, chaired by Dehaene, on more technical articles. The two 
existing articles on the Common Commercial Policy, Art. 131 and 133, had been more or less copied 
and pasted into the draft constitutional text as Articles 23 and 24 of Part II, Title B. John Bruton, the 
former Prime Minister of Ireland now representing national parliaments in the Praesidium, suggested 
that some reference needed to be made in the provision on Objectives to the “removal of obstacles to 
foreign direct investment” (the rapid economic growth of Ireland, then known as the Celtic Tiger, was 
being fueled by FDI). This was agreed. Michel Barnier, the then EU Commissioner for Regional 
Policy who was acting as representative of the EU Commission in the Praesidium, then proposed to 
make the change operational via the EU competence by also adding “and foreign direct investment” in 
the provision describing the Common Commercial Policy –which happened without further 
discussion.  
The Praesidium endorsed the text of draft articles at the end of the day. As the French expression 
goes, this opportunistic four-word add-on went “like a letter in the mail”; it was not even mentioned in 
the summary of the proceedings (European Convention Secretariat, 2003).  
From draft to the final Constitutional Treaty 
The next step was the discussion of the draft text prepared by the Praesidium in the full Convention. 
As expected, the chapter on external action proved to be the most controversial, especially the 
provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the External Action Service. The 
Common Commercial Policy was almost forgotten amidst the deluge of several thousands of 
amendments that were proposed on the EU’s external action. Only 99 amendments were raised 
concerning the CCP (European Convention, 2003).  
Out of these 99 amendments on trade policy, only 32 were about foreign direct investment. These 
all asked specifically to strike down the inclusion of “foreign direct investment” from the competence 
of the EU. Some of these amendments argued that foreign direct investment fell under the free 
circulation of capital, instead of trade policy, and was governed as a result by mixed competences or 
even by exclusive competence of the Member States. Others asked that FDI be subjected to unanimity 
voting. Some claimed that “Foreign Direct Investment is an entirely different field from trade policy 
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and its inclusion in the Common Commercial Policy would represent an immense and possibly 
unintended increase in EU competence” (Voggenhuber, MacCormick, Wagener, Lichtenberger, & 
Nagy, 2003). One amendment explained that even though the intent of the Commission might have 
been justified, the article needed to be made more precise: “We understand that inclusion of “foreign 
direct investment” is intended to address a Commission request to be able to conduct negotiations on a 
multilateral investment treaty in the WTO rather than to remove Member State competence to conduct 
bilateral investment activity. We would support the intention. However, we see the need to use a more 
precise term than “foreign direct investment”” (Hain, 2003).  
A few amendments commented on the stealthy actions of the secretariat and/or the Commission: 
one wrote that “there was no such recommendation for the inclusion of foreign direct investment from 
the working group” (Earl of Stockton, 2003), while another one commented that “The inclusion of a 
reference to foreign direct investment in the draft is another example of the secretariat taking a 
unilateral decision to greatly extend the scope of the article, despite there having been no such 
recommendation from the working group” (Heathcoat-Amory, 2003).  
The majority (10) of these anti-FDI amendments came from French politicians, followed by British 
and German politicians, several of whom were very prominent politicians such as Dominique de 
Villepin (France’s foreign affairs minister), Joschka Fischer (Germany’s foreign affairs minister), and 
Peter Hain (a member of the British cabinet who was representing the Blair government at the 
Convention). In spite of the prominence of its backers, these amendments asking from the exclusion of 
FDI from EU competence were a drop in the bucket of all the other controversies surrounding the 
proposed changes to the EU’s capacities for external action.  
The sweeping extension of EU competence over foreign investment policy was not much noticed in 
legal, business, or academic circles either, with very few exceptions, such as the Confederation of 
British Industries which denounced the Constitution’s excessive centralization of foreign and 
commercial powers with the EU Commission (Peterson & Ceyssens, 2003). 
When the IGC approved the draft treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in June 2004, the 
two articles (renamed III-216 and III-217) enshrining the inclusion of foreign direct investment under 
the Common Commercial Policy were left intact (Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States, 2004). 
From the Constitution to the Lisbon Treaty 
After the Constitutional Treaty failed to be ratified as a result of its popular rejection through referenda 
in France and the Netherlands in 2005, the Member States reworked the constitution in what came to 
be known as the Treaty of Lisbon, which they signed in December 2007 and which came into force 
two years later. The Irish presidency did not want to reopen substantive issues during the IGC that 
followed the failure of the constitution. Following the guiding principle of the non-reopening of the 
substance, trade policy was not reopened, in spite of the raising of some Member State objections 
against the inclusion of FDI during the IGC. In the end, the paragraphs in the articles extending the 
scope of trade policy to foreign direct investment and subjecting it now to exclusive Community 
competence (now renamed Art. 206 and 207) made it intact into the new treaty from the version 
hastily conceived in the Praesidium (Council of the European Union, 2009). 
The simple three word addition of “foreign direct investment” in the Lisbon Treaty changed the 
complex, multi-layered situation governing FDI in Europe and radically reformed, de jure, the 
competences over foreign direct investment policy. According to Article 207 TFEU, “The common 
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff 
rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and services, and the 
commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of uniformity 
in measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in 
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the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context 
of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action.” Therefore, foreign direct investment is 
now exclusively part of the Common Commercial Policy: in principle, it is up to the Commission to 
negotiate BITs, to protect EU outbound FDI abroad, and presumably to regulate inbound FDI on 
behalf of the Member States. 
Explaining the competence shift 
Why did the competence shift happen? It was certainly not the result of intergovernmental bargaining 
since the outcome ran counter to the preferences of all Member States. Neither was it the result of 
pressures from business group, who were divided on the issue and not proactive in any way. The 
competence shift was more the result of a combination of serendipity, stealth, and prioritization than 
of straight Commission entrepreneurship.  
The competence shift first and foremost resulted from smart agency by the Commission. FDI made 
its way into the draft Treaty through serendipitous circumstances. If not for the last minute inclusion 
of “foreign direct investment” in the draft article on the Common Commercial Policy through the 
prompt action of Commission representatives, FDI probably would not have become an exclusive 
competence of the EU until at least the following treaty revision, since it had not been included in the 
draft produced by the working group.  
Stealth being the key here, the Commission did not broadcast the proposed shift. However, some 
politicians noticed the stealth inclusion of the competence shift in the final draft and tried to derail it. 
Why did they fail? First, they could not derail the competence shift for procedural reasons. As all 
amendments, the ones on FDI mentioned earlier were discussed by the Praesidium, which was mindful 
that it was the Praesidium itself that had made the modification, that it was justified on the basis of the 
evolution of the world economy, and that the arguments against the shift were not convincing.
3
 In the 
remainder of the Convention, FDI was no longer raised, so the Praesidium found that there was a 
consensus on it.
4
 Subsequently, the Lisbon Treaty was adopted without reopening the non-
controversial areas of the Constitution, so that is how FDI was formally transferred to the EU. 
Second, Member States did not derail the FDI competence shift because, even though there was no 
support for it, fighting the shift was not a political priority either amidst an extremely busy agenda. 
This was a question of prioritization. At the Praesidium, the chapter on external relations produced 
thousands of amendments, in particular on CFSP (this was the time of the Iraq war). Member States 
had to pick their battles. While there was effectively a discussion on trade, no Member State delegate 
prioritized an amendment on FDI to discuss in the second round of amendments.
5
 In isolation, the 
Member States would have fought the competence shift, but given the time and resource constraints 
they had to devote to the complex Constitution, they chose to fight more important issues. 
4. A protracted political battle in the implementation phase? 
Did the consequences under which the competence over FDI was transferred have implications on the 
implementation of the new policy? During the transition period, the Commission has produced a 
variety of documents to clarify and map the future of European investment policy (European 
Commission, 2010; European Commission, 2010). But Member State support for these efforts has 
been minimal for the moment, reinforcing the argument made in this paper that the transfer to 
exclusive supranational competence happened with little debate. This makes implementation difficult 
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4
 There are unfortunately no minutes of the Praesidium. 
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as there has been no political appetite from the Member States to surrender sovereignty and move 
investment policy up to the supranational level in practice, especially in the current climate of 
suspicion and disillusionment regarding European integration. This section explores the real political 
debate that starts now, in the implementation phase, yet constrained by the framework that Member 
States reluctantly or inadvertently agreed to in the Treaty.  
Confusion over the definition of Foreign Direct Investment 
The Lisbon Treaty did not define “foreign direct investment”. According to the standard definition 
accepted by policymakers and academics, direct investment is a class of investment where the investor 
acquires at least 10% of the voting power of an enterprise, which establishes ‘lasting interest’ and 
control over the affiliated company’s operations – in contrast to portfolio investment where investors 
do not generally expect to influence the management of the enterprise (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 1993). The EU Commission had 
indicated in 2002 in its “Concept paper on the definition of investment”, a communication by the 
Commission to the WTO working group on the relationship between trade and investment, that it 
shared that definition (European Community, 2002). Therefore, the broad policy understanding is that 
the new exclusive competence does not apply to portfolio investment, over which Member States 
presumably retain competence. Indeed, the majority of legal scholars concur that the Treaty does not 
extend EU competence to portfolio investment (Herrmann, 2010; Bungenberg, Griebel, & Hindelang, 
European Yearbook of International Economic Law: International investment Law and EU Law, 
2011). 
Nevertheless, because of the vagueness of the wording in the Lisbon Treaty and especially because 
of the fact that most international investment agreements do not distinguish between direct and 
portfolio investment, this will certainly be open to interpretation (Herrmann, 2010). As legal scholar 
Julien Chaisse recently wrote, “it is safe to conclude that the EU now holds exclusive competence over 
FDI, which is interpreted to include the classical standards of investment protection. However, the 
absence of definition of “FDI” in the Treaty still leaves scope for disagreement. In fact, one can be 
sure that those Member States which are unhappy with the competence transfer and intend to retain 
their existing BITs will ask the CJEU to clarify this issue” (Chaisse, 2012, p. 9). 
Disputed competences over the negotiation of international investment treaties 
Confusion reigned initially over the validity of existing Bilateral Investment Treaties, the competence 
to conclude exiting negotiations, and the competence to negotiate new treaties. Some international 
arbitration lawyers started noticing in 2008 the implications of the reform: Member States would no 
longer be allowed to enter into new BITs, but what does this mean for existing BITs? This is the area 
where most political capital has been expended so far by Member States. 
This initial confusion, evidence that this major reform had taken place mostly “under the radar” of 
the Member States, is best illustrated by the following anecdote. On December 1, 2009, Germany had 
organized a major conference on Bilateral Investment Treaties to celebrate the “Golden Jubilee” 
anniversary of its BIT with Pakistan, which was the first BIT signed in the world in November 1959.
6
 
At this occasion, Germany was supposed to sign a new BIT with Pakistan. This conference had been 
planned for a long time and included speakers such as Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yousaf Raza 
Gilani, many German politicians, and a large assortment of European academics, practicing lawyers, 
and business people. Shortly before the conference, one of the German negotiators suddenly realized 
                                                     
6
 “Fifty Years of Bilateral Investment Treaties Conference 2009: Taking Stock of the Future”, 1-3 December 2009, 
Frankfurt am Mein, Germany, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&StdntWrtngC
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that the reform of FDI introduced in the Lisbon Treaty had potentially transferred the competence over 
BITs. He asked the Commission if Germany was still competent to sign its own BIT with Pakistan and 
was told that, no, the competence had indeed been transferred on 1 December, the date of entry into 
force of the Lisbon treaty (also the start date for the conference!); however, that Treaty (in article 2(1) 
TFEU) did offer the possibility to transfer back competence to the Member States and to grandfather 
national BITs, and the Commission intended to use that possibility. 
7
 In the end, the BIT was ratified 
in 2011 by the German Parliament and then sent to the European Commission for final approval.  
The most immediate effort expended by the Commission in order to transform the vague inclusion 
of foreign direct investment in the Lisbon Treaty into a coherent, implementable policy has focused on 
outbound investment and notably the status of Bilateral Investment Treaties. This focus is 
understandable since the EU is a net outward investor, especially in emerging economies, and its 
Member States have more than 1,200 agreements with extra-EU countries.  
The Commission has been very pragmatic so far in interpreting and implementing the new EU 
policy sketched by the Lisbon Treaty, especially in the face of opposition, if not “denial”, by Member 
States.
8
 It has acknowledged that the EU will not be able to negotiate international agreements to 
replace the plethora of existing Member State BITs because its material and personnel resources are 
limited, even if its long-term goal is for EU BITs to replace national BITs. The new regulation dealing 
with extra-EU BITs came into force in January 2013 (European Commission, 2012). It “grandfathers” 
existing treaties by confirming their validity until the EU decides to replace them. It also allows 
Member States to open talks with third countries with whom the EU has not concluded a BIT, though 
such talks will need to be supervised and approved by the Commission (European Commission, 2012). 
Instead, the Commission will concentrate on a few agreements that it deems crucial for the EU as a 
whole, such as with Canada, India and Singapore. Pragmatically, it lets Member States negotiate BITs 
with the “small fish”, while it takes care of negotiation with the “big fish”. 
One potential problem, however, may be whether third countries agree with that transfer of 
competences. They may refuse to recognize this new competence and cling to their old agreements, 
especially the BITs with a “sunset clause” making them still valid several decades after their 
termination. What is in it for them? They may refuse to recognize the new EU authority because of the 
EU’s lack of competence in portfolio investment. What would be the incentive to switch to an EU 
investment treaty if it does not cover all aspects of the existing BITs individually concluded by 
Member States in the past? They may also refuse to renegotiate existing agreements to take into 
account the new supranational competence because of the reciprocal demands that a EU with more 
bargaining leverage may make on them. How to get third countries on board is not an issue that has 
been the topic of much political debate among the Member States. 
A looming political battle over inbound FDI 
Nobody, neither in the Member States nor at the Commission, gave much thought to the policies 
governing inward investment
9, even though with a stock of $7.5 trillion the EU is the world’s largest 
recipient of FDI (OECD, 2013). Yet the inclusion of foreign direct investment under the purview of 
the Common Commercial Policy leaves many questions unanswered about inward FDI. Investment 
promotion, like trade promotion, is one area that the EU is probably leaving to Member States. But 
what about the vetting of particular investment deals? Right now each country has its own national 
procedures (or has none), whether based on national security or on economic criteria. Theoretically, 
under current practice, a foreign investor can be turned down by one Member State on grounds of 
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national security and then invest in another one instead --and as a result have its goods or services 
circulate throughout the Single Market, including in the country from which it was initially barred. 
Today, only ten Member States have restrictions in place to screen foreign investment in defense-
related sectors, and only Lithuania has an outright prohibition on FDI in defense and security from 
non-EU and non-NATO members (Fiott, 2012). Has the vetting of inward investment become an 
exclusive competence of the EU?  
Implementation will be very difficult when it comes to inbound investment because there are so 
many divisions among the Member States, between the Member States and EU institutions, and within 
the EU institutions. So far no proposal on inbound investment has been followed through with actual 
legislation. 
The strongest supporter so far of a common approach to inbound investment has been the European 
Parliament, which now has a bigger say on trade policy as a result of the Lisbon Treaty. In part 
because of the challenges and growing fears triggered by the surge of Chinese FDI into Europe, the 
European Parliament formally asked the Commission and the Member States in 2012 “to set up a body 
entrusted with the ex ante evaluation of foreign strategic investment, along the lines of the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), in order to obtain a clear picture of businesses 
operating and investing in the territory of the EU” (European Parliament, 2012, p. 25).  
The Commission has so far been divided regarding the necessity of establishing a common vetting 
system for foreign investment into the EU. In February 2011, the EU Commissioners for Industry and 
Entrepreneurship, Antonio Tajani, and the Internal Market, Michel Barnier, wrote a joint letter to 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso on foreign investment. They warned against Europe’s 
naivete and recommended specifically the development of a supranational body to vet FDI in the EU, 
analogous to the CFIUS system in place in the United States to make sure that non-EU investments in 
Europe are not for real “attempts to close down businesses after having stolen all of their "know-how"' 
(European Commission, 2011). The majority of Commission officials, however, dismissed this 
proposal, on the grounds that this would be interpreted as a protectionist move, could alienate Chinese 
investments in Europe, and have repercussions on European investment in China. The EU should 
remain open to all foreign investment in order to “lead by example”. Leading the charge against a 
European version of CFIUS, European Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht cautioned against a 
“neither desirable nor feasible” screening system for investment at the EU level, recalling the multiple 
benefits of foreign investment (increased productivity, increased trade, access to capital, etc.) and 
reminding his fellow Europeans of the reality: “we need the money” (De Gucht, 2012). Such a system, 
he argues, would also national security considerations to be used “…as a false pretense to justify the 
protection of vested economic interests.”   
As for the Member States, no one for now is openly supporting this proposal. The Member States 
that do benefit from their lax national standards and regulatory competition (mostly in Central, 
Eastern, and Southern Europe) have no incentive to push for a more cohesive approach to inbound 
FDI policy. The Member States that do have screening rules (such as France, Germany, the 
Netherlands) do not want to transfer in practice the authority over inbound investment policy to the 
EU either, because it might jeopardize their own national security should such a screening mechanism 
may be forfeited by the majority of Member States. As for the other Member States (such as the 
Scandinavian countries), they may fear that the transfer of such authority to the EU would create a 
more restrictive, protectionist investment regime, and therefore oppose such a transfer on liberal 
grounds. 
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5. Conclusion 
By tracing the process through which the EU acquired, in theory, exclusive competence over FDI 
policy, this paper provided a case-study of institutional development and competence creep in action. 
It showed that the competence shift over one of the most important areas of the global economy 
happened under the radar, in spite of opposition from all the Member States. However, it did not 
happen through treachery by the Commission, but rather through a combination of serendipity and 
prioritization among a busy, complex agenda. 
The EU is still a hybrid and ambiguous international actor when it comes to FDI policy, and it will 
remain so for a while, this article predicts, notwithstanding the radical delegation of competence 
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Does the formal competence shift matters if Member States do not 
support implementation? Formally, the competence to make policy affecting both outbound and 
inbound foreign direct investment and to negotiate international investment agreements belongs 
exclusively to the EU. In practice, however, the scope of the EU’s authority has so far been limited by 
the lack of Member State support resulting from individual preferences formed over fifty years of 
negotiating investment terms on a national basis. 
Because of the absence of political debate prior to the competence shift, confusion still reigns and 
Member States are not willing to let go of their sovereignty that easily. Therefore, it would not be 
improbable for the issue to ultimately escalate to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), should a 
controversial case arise.  
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